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SHOOTING FOR THE MOON: THE INNOCENCE OF THE NO 
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT’S ONE HUNDRED PERCENT 
PROFICIENCY GOAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
“Shoot for the moon.  Even if you miss, you will land among the stars.” 
–Motivational speaker and successful businessman, Les Brown1 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 10, 2008, Margaret Spellings, Secretary of Education, declared 
that the Education Department is “committed to our promise of grade-level or 
better for every child by 2014 because it’s the right thing to do.  Not just for 
our kids, but for our country’s long-term economic security.”2  Undoubtedly, 
this statement reflected her continued belief that the administration and the 
legislature should stay true to No Child Left Behind’s3 ultimate goal of having 
one hundred percent of America’s students at or above grade level in reading, 
math, and science by the year 2014 because, she believes, it is working.4 
President George W. Bush has frequently stated that the No Child Left 
Behind Act (“NCLB” or “the Act”) is necessary to combat the “soft bigotry of 
low expectations.”5  Yet in recent years, few topics have been scrutinized by 
 
 1. See Selfgrowth.com, The Online Self Improvement Encyclopedia, Les Brown, 
http://www.selfgrowth.com/experts/les_brown.html.  This popular “self-help” quote is generally 
attributed to Les Brown.  See, e.g., SHARRON OROVAN-JOHNSTON, TAKE THE WHEELS OFF 
YOUR BUS: ATTACK ANXIETY WITH HUMOUR 61 (2006); KIM CADOTTE, POSITIVE WAY TO 
START YOUR DAY 7 (2007). 
 2. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings 
Discusses No Child Left Behind, Priorities for 2008 During Remarks at National Press Club in 
Washington DC (Jan. 10, 2008), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2008/01/ 
01102008.html. 
 3. “No Child Left Behind” refers generally to amendments made to the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–
7941 (2006)). 
 4. See Newshour: School Districts Find Loophole in No Child Left Behind Law (PBS 
television broadcast Aug. 14, 2007), [hereinafter Newshour] (transcript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education/july-dec07/nclb_08-14.html) (statement by Margaret 
Spellings) (“I choose to believe that the people in states are working hard to improve education 
for their kids.  Have we made progress?  Have we raised the level of intensity, and the level of 
rigor, and the level of anxiety for grownups to respond to kids?  You bet we have.”). 
 5. Although this phrase has been used often by President Bush in support of NCLB, it had 
been invoked by him even before he became president.  In a speech at the Latin Business 
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educational scholars more than NCLB.  The Act’s faults have been pointed out 
by educational policy scholars, sociologists, equal rights activists, economists, 
and legal scholars, among others.6  NCLB has received harsh criticism since its 
inception,7 and despite pressure to reauthorize NCLB, Congress did not act on 
the issue in 2007.8 
The driving force behind NCLB is its ultimate goal of one hundred percent 
proficiency by 2014.  Generally, this “goal” derives from the “Timeline” 
section of the Act, which states that “Each State shall establish a timeline for 
adequate yearly progress.  The timeline shall ensure that not later than 12 years 
after the end of the 2001–2002 school year, all students in each group . . . will 
meet or exceed the State’s proficient level of academic achievement on the 
State assessments . . . .”9  Progress is determined and sanctions are applied to 
individual schools based on progress toward this “shoot for the moon” goal of 
one hundred percent proficiency for all American school children.10 
Yet lurking behind the seeming innocence of this goal are the detrimental 
consequences that result from states trying in vain to attain it.  Despite Les 
Brown’s insistence, in reality falling short of the moon won’t land you safely 
on a star.  It will leave you floating in outer space, or send you crashing to the 
ground.  Similarly, the incentives that NCLB brings, and the practices that 
 
Association Luncheon in Los Angeles, CA, then-Governor Bush stated, “Some say it is unfair to 
hold disadvantaged children to rigorous standards.  I say it is discrimination to require anything 
less—the soft bigotry of low expectations.  Some say that schools can’t be expected to teach, 
because there are too many broken families, too many immigrants, too much diversity.  I say that 
pigment and poverty need not determine performance.  That myth is disproved by good schools 
every day.  Excuse-making must end before learning can begin.”  Gov. George W. Bush, 
Education: No Child Left Behind (Sept. 2, 1999), in REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE & 
BUSH FOR PRESIDENT, INC., RENEWING AMERICA’S PURPOSE: POLICY ADDRESSES OF GEORGE 
W. BUSH, JULY 1999–JULY 2000, at 17 (2000); Kevin G. Welner & Don Q. Weitzman, The Soft 
Bigotry of Low Expenditures, 38 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. 242, 242 (2005), available at 
http://epsl.asu.edu/epru/articles/EPRU-0508-134-OWI.pdf. 
 6. For general overview of criticism for NCLB, see generally Philip T.K. Daniel, No Child 
Left Behind: The Balm of Gilead has Arrived in American Education, 206 ED. LAW. REP. 791, 
797–813 (2006) (outlining several of the major sources of critique of NCLB from states, school 
districts, and scholars). 
 7. See generally Linda Darling-Hammond, Evaluating, ‘No Child Left Behind,’ NATION, 
May 21, 2007, at 11–18 (listing the various ways that states, schools, teachers, and parents have 
protested and criticized NCLB). 
 8. Sheryl G. Stolberg & Diana J. Schemo, Bush Prodding Congress to Reauthorize His 
Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/10/ 
washington/10bush.html?ref =education. 
 9. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F) (2006). 
 10. As used in this paper, the term “one hundred percent proficiency” refers to the 
proficiency of the general population of students in a school, as well as each sub-group defined 
under the Act.  See id. § 6311(b)(2).  Recent pilot programs by the Department of Education, 
however, could make this term less inclusive for some states.  See infra note 41. 
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states and educators have undertaken in the name of this seemingly innocent, 
though ambitious, goal will not result in a sparkly new future for historically 
low-achieving children; it will lead to disastrous results. 
While countless scholars and commentaries have sought to analyze the 
detrimental effects that NCLB has on American education, this Comment 
focuses on the one hundred percent proficiency goal itself.  By analyzing 
educational research, scholarly articles, and recent litigation, this Comment 
contends that not only is this goal irrational and unsupported; it has led states, 
school districts, individual schools, and teachers to commence in inevitable, 
yet wholly counter-productive practices that work against the noble intentions 
of NCLB.11  Moreover, it is the author’s own suggestion that the goal itself, 
championed by President Bush as necessary to combat the “soft bigotry of low 
expectations,” might actually create low expectations—expectations of 
minimum proficiency. 
In order to lay a framework for the analysis, Part I of this Comment gives a 
brief overview of how the one hundred percent goal functions in the NCLB 
Act.  This includes a brief description of how NCLB works, a short recitation 
of federal education policy that has led to the current goal, and an analysis of 
what one hundred percent proficiency means in the context of the Act.  This 
paper does not seek to explain the specific mechanisms of the law in detail, but 
rather merely to provide a background for the reader. 
Part II of this Comment attempts to tackle the logic and rationale of the 
goal by examining the possible “innocent” explanations that proponents of 
NCLB have used to defend this “shoot for the moon strategy.”  As a response 
to these explanations, Part II also explores data which reveals the sheer 
implausibility of the goal itself. 
Part III presents three main categories of problems that have arisen as 
reactions to NCLB and links these problems to the one hundred percent 
proficiency goal.  These problems include states lowering standards to adhere 
to NCLB requirements, states abandoning proven and successful educational 
practices in order to meet the ever increasing requirements of NCLB, and the 
phenomenon of historically failing schools falling further behind as a result of 
NCLB’s unreachable goals. 
Part IV analyzes a sample of proposals to amend NCLB that deal with the 
2014 goal and concludes that none of the proposed changes are strong enough 
to deter the negative incentives; the goal simply does not work in any real 
sense. 
 
 11. See Newshour, supra note 4 (statement of Chester Finn, former Assistant Secretary of 
Education under President Reagan) (“There’s not an educator in the country that thinks that it’s 
real or can happen, not one. Unfortunately, it breeds cynicism among educators. They say, ‘Well, 
why shouldn’t we take advantage of every angle we can take advantage of so we don’t look bad 
in the process of not achieving that goal?’”). 
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Finally, Part V concludes this Comment by presenting the author’s view 
that beyond the demonstrated statistics from the preceding sections, NCLB’s 
proficiency goal enables a new type of “soft bigotry of low expectations.”  
Specifically, shifting focus from Brown v. Board of Education’s promise of 
“opportunity” to NCLB’s target of “results” creates a climate in which 
historically low-performing schools are motivated to provide only enough 
resources and energy for students to reach minimum proficiency. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF NCLB AND ITS STATED GOAL 
A. The Basics of the No Child Left Behind Act 
The No Child Left Behind Act is by no means the first piece of federal 
legislation aimed at improving the nation’s education system.12  Nonetheless, 
its passage symbolized a consensus among lawmakers that the federal 
government should take a new approach in addressing the nation’s educational 
problems.13  Accordingly, the Act seeks to “ensure that all children have a fair, 
equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, 
at a minimum, proficiency on challenging state academic achievement 
standards and state academic assessments.”14  It is the direct and mandatory 
focus on achievement, particularly as measured through standardized testing, 
that made NCLB such a dramatic shift in the federal approach to education.15 
The basic premise of NCLB is simple.16  All American public school 
children must be proficient in reading and mathematics by the year 2014.17  In 
order to receive federal Title I funding,18 a state must submit a plan that: 
 
 12. For a brief description of how NCLB evolved from previous federal education acts, see 
JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY 1–3 (1999). 
 13. Kimberly J. Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a Federal 
Right to Education, 40 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1658 (2007). 
 14. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). 
 15. See GAIL L. SUNDERMAN, JAMES S. KIM & GARY ORFIELD, NCLB MEETS SCHOOL 
REALITIES: LESSONS FROM THE FIELD, xxv (2005) (“In many ways, [NCLB] is the most startling 
departure in federal educational policy in U.S. history.”). 
 16. For a recent and well-articulated judicial summary of how NCLB works, see Sch. Dist. 
of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 254–58 (6th Cir. 2008), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 05-2708, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12121 (6th Cir. May 1, 
2008). 
 17. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F)&(G) (2006). 
 18. The term “Title I funding” refers to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 6301, which seeks “‘to provide the full educational opportunity for 
every child regardless of economic background.’”  Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997) 
(citations omitted). Functionally, “Title I channels federal funds, through the States, to ‘local 
educational agencies.’”  Id. (citations omitted). 
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(a) sets challenging academic standards;19 (b) tests children annually to 
determine if the standards are being met;20and (c) develops “a single, statewide 
State accountability system.”21  For the accountability requirement, a state 
must use a determination of “Adequate Yearly Progress” (AYP),22 with the 
term “adequate” meaning that the school’s progress is on target to meet the 
Act’s ultimate goal of one hundred percent proficiency by 2014.23  Generally it 
is the states, not the federal Education Department, that make this 
determination.24 
The Act also sets out a system for “school improvement,” which targets 
those schools that fail to make AYP.25  Using self-determined academic 
standards and assessments, states must apply different labels to schools, which 
must also be made known to the public.26  Any school that fails to make AYP 
for two consecutive years is labeled as “identif[ied] for school improvement.”27  
This means that “the local educational agency shall, not later than the first day 
of the school year following such identification, provide all students enrolled  
in the school with the option to transfer to another public school served by the 
local educational agency . . . .”28  This is commonly referred to as the “school 
choice” provision.  Such a school must also develop and submit a plan that 
details how it intends to improve its student performance.29 
If the school fails to make AYP in the next year, it must offer 
“supplemental education services” (SES), such as after-school programs run by 
private companies, to its students.30  Schools that continue to fail to make AYP 
two years after being identified for improvement are then labeled for 
“corrective action.”31  Under this label, in addition to offering school choice 
and SES, a school must take at least one of the following corrective actions: 
 
 19. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1) (2006). 
 20. Id. § 6311(b)(3). 
 21. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(A). 
 22. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B). 
 23. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(F).  At the Act’s inception, each state was charged with establishing a 
starting point for the number of students who must meet or exceed the State’s proficient level.  Id. 
§ 6311(b)(2)(E).  Thereafter, the state must set annual measurable objectives for core subjects and 
subgroups, the attainment of which marks sufficient progress toward proficiency. Id. § 
6311(b)(2)(G). 
 24. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(G) (2006). 
 25. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(A). 
 26. Id. § 6316(a). 
 27. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(A). 
 28. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i).  As it is used in the Act, the term “local educational agency” (also 
referred to as an “LEA”) generally refers to a school district. 
 29. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(3)(A) (2006). 
 30. Id. § 6316(b)(5)(B). 
 31. Id. § 6316(b)(7). 
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1) replace the school staff, 
2) implement a new curriculum, 
3) decrease the school-level management authority, 
4) appoint an outside expert, 
5) extend the school day or year, or 
6) restructure the internal organization of the school.32 
Finally, for schools that still fail to meet AYP, the final label to be applied is 
“[r]estructuring,” in which a school must take one or more of the following 
more drastic “alternative governance” arrangements: 
1) reopen the school as a charter school, 
2) replace the staff, 
3) contract out the school to a private company, 
4) institute a state takeover of the school, or 
5) “[a]ny other major restructuring of the school’s governance arrangement 
that makes fundamental reforms . . . .”33 
B. The One Hundred Percent Proficiency Goal and Historically 
Disadvantaged Sub-groups 
For a school to make AYP, it is not as simple as having a certain 
percentage of the total students pass proficiency exams.  In order to combat the 
“soft bigotry of low expectations,” NCLB “shines a spotlight on social 
inequities in school performance that sometimes have been obscured in the 
past.”34  This is accomplished by requiring schools to “report test results 
separately for students in different demographic subgroups . . . .”35  These 
subgroups, which directly address NCLB’s stated purpose of meeting the 
educational needs of historically “low-achieving children,”36 include 
“economically disadvantaged students[,] students from major racial and ethnic 
groups[,] students with disabilities[,] and students with limited English 
proficiency.”37  Accordingly, NCLB’s goal of one hundred percent proficiency 
in math, reading, and science by the year 2014 refers to the performance of not 
only the general student population of a school,38 but the performance of these 
 
 32. Id. § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv)(I)–(VI). 
 33. Id. § 6316(b)(8). 
 34. Adam Gamoran, Introduction: Can Standards-Based Reform Help Reduce the Poverty 
Gap in Education?, in STANDARDS-BASED REFORM AND THE POVERTY GAP: LESSONS FOR NO 
CHILD LEFT BEHIND 4 (Adam Gamoran ed., 2007). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(2) (2006). 
 37. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II)(aa)–(dd). 
 38. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(I). 
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individual sub-groups as well.39  Each sub-group must meet the AYP 
requirement for a school to escape a failing label. 
For example, if a school needs 65% of its students to be at or above grade 
level in math to make AYP for the 2007–2008 school year, not only must the 
school have 65% percent of its total students pass that year’s state math 
assessment, but 65% of the school’s “economically disadvantaged students” 
and “students with disabilities,” and any other qualifying sub-group in the 
school must pass as well.40  If just one sub-group has less than 65% of its 
members pass, the school is labeled failing.41  The Act also requires that at 
least ninety-five percent of students in each sub-group take the test.42 
C. How Did the Goal Come to Be?: A Brief Look at Federal Education’s 
Precursors to NCLB’s One Hundred Percent Proficiency Goal 
Ideas of accountability, even the concept of AYP, appeared in federal 
education legislation well before NCLB.  A relevant starting point is President 
George H.W. Bush’s 1990 State of the Union address, which laid out six 
national goals for education.43  Goals 2000, passed under President Clinton, 
required states to develop standards and conduct achievement assessments 
related to these goals.44  This focus on accountability “shifted responsibility for 
compliance to schools and individual principals and teachers rather than either 
state or district levels.”45 
 
 39. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II)(aa)–(dd). 
 40. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(I)(i) (“Each year, for a school to make adequately yearly progress . . . 
each [sub-group] . . . must meet or exceed the objectives set by the State.”). 
 41. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(I)(i) (2006); but see id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II) (stating that 
performance data for these individual sub-groups “shall not be required in a case in which the 
number of students in a category is insufficient to yield statistically reliable information or the 
results would reveal personally identifiable information about an individual student”).  It should 
also be noted that in July, 2008, Secretary of Education Spellings approved six states’ proposals 
to modify the “all-or-nothing” approach.  Under the proposals, states will be allowed to vary the 
intensity of NCLB’s sanctions “to match the academic reasons that lead to a school’s 
identification.”  See Dept. of Ed., Secretary Spellings Approves 6 States Differentiated 
Accountability Proposals (2008), http://www.ed.gov/nclb/accountability/differentiated/fact 
sheet03.pdf (last visited May 17, 2009). The six states approved for the “differentiated 
accountability pilot program” are Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, and Ohio.  Id. 
 42. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(I)(ii) (2006).  Note that the same section gives a waiver of this 
testing requirement as well, “in a case in which the number of students in a category is 
insufficient to yield statistically reliable information or the results would reveal personally 
identifiable information about an individual student.”  Id. 
 43. E. JANE IRONS & SANDRA HARRIS, THE CHALLENGES OF NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND:  
UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES OF EXCELLENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CHOICE 6 (2007). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  For an argument that such a shift in focus to precinct level behavior is unworkable, 
see Frederick M. Hess & Chester E. Finn, Jr., Crash Course: NCLB Is Driven by Education 
Politics, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2007, at 40, 45 (“Even the Great Society’s most daring and important 
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When Congress passed the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA) in 
1994 to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), 
“improving accountability” meant that states and local education agencies were 
to submit to the Secretary of Education a plan of “challenging” standards and 
assessments.46  Although at that time, accountability meant that states and 
school districts had to make “adequate yearly progress” (as in NCLB), the 
measures that could qualify as AYP were decided by the Secretary.47  
Nonetheless, by the time NCLB was enacted “only 19 states had fully 
approved standards and assessment systems mandated six years earlier under 
the 1994 law.”48 
Under NCLB, this changed.  AYP under NCLB is derived from a timeline, 
scaled from the Act’s goal that all children, and each sub-group defined under 
the law, reach one hundred percent proficiency by 2014.49  This focus on 
absolute results is NCLB’s cornerstone, and a small but very significant 
departure from previous federal legislation. 
II.  THE PURPOSE AND LOGIC OF THE GOAL 
A. Congress Aims High: The Innocence of the One Hundred Percent 
Proficiency Goal 
Perhaps the fact that so many states did not comply with previous federal 
mandates for accountability structures could suggest that a more solid timeline 
was needed in 2001.  But exactly why Congress would actually agree to a 
timeline based on one hundred percent proficiency of all students has baffled 
some scholars.  It is doubtful that the language was anything but deliberate, 
although even President Bush has conceded that he did not read the Act before 
signing it.50 
 
victories avoided the sweeping hubris of NCLB.  Neither the Civil Rights Act of 1964 nor the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, both remembered now as towering triumphs, ever sought to change 
precinct-level behaviors.”). 
 46. Improving America’s Schools Act, Pub. L. No. 103-382, Tit. I, Sec. 1111, 1112 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.), available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
legislation/ESEA/toc.html. 
 47. Id. at Sec. 1111(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 48. SUNDERMAN, KIM, & ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 5 (citing Erik W. Robelen, States, Ed. 
Dept. Reach Accords on 1994 ESEA, EDUC. WEEK, April 17, 2002, available at  http://www.ed 
week.org/ew/articles/2002/04/17/31esea.h21.html). 
 49. 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(F) (2006). 
 50. See SUNDERMAN, KIM, & ORFIELD, supra note 15, at xxvi. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] SHOOTING FOR THE MOON 907 
Of course aiming high is not a new concept, especially for politicians.51  
Perhaps a generally accepted rationale for such a goal is that of journalist Jay 
Mathews, who wrote, “The 100 percent goal was simply a target . . . designed 
to motivate schools to stretch themselves to do better, such as scientists trying 
to cure cancer or gardeners hoping to grow the perfect tomato.”52  The logic 
thus seems innocent enough—politicians must set the highest goal for 
educators, and as they strive to reach it, whether or not they are successful, the 
aggregate effect will be improvement for all schools.53 
Yet “aiming high” is not the only explanation.  Even though the vast 
majority of scholars involved with educational research and policy would 
agree that the goal is implausible, it is wishful thinking to assume that all of the 
legislators had the same perception when they enacted NCLB.  The 
Congressional Record reflects several stories of Congressmen pronouncing 
how their own state’s accountability systems have brought about educational 
miracles.54  The supportive and “inspiring” illustration of Representative Ric 
 
 51. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2006) (proclaiming, as part of the Clean Water Act, 
that “it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated 
by 1985”); Al Gore, We Can Solve It Campaign: A Generational Challenge to Repower America 
(July 17, 2008) (transcript and video available at http://www.wecansolveit.org/pages/al_gore_a_ 
generational_challenge_to_repower_america/) (challenging America “to commit to producing 
100 percent of our electricity from renewable energy and truly clean carbon-free sources within 
10 years”). 
 52. Kevin G. Welner, Can Irrational Become Unconstitutional? NCLB’s 100% 
Presuppositions, 38 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. 171, 176 (2005) (quoting Jay Mathews, No 
Child Left Behind Act: Facts and Fiction, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at A08).  Welner also 
criticizes those who would defend such a seemingly unattainable goal by recalling President 
Kennedy’s seemingly outrageous goal of landing on the moon, stating that the difference is that 
“Kennedy could point to experts describing the plausibility of the goal.  President Bush is not in a 
position to do this.”  Id. at 176. 
 53. One must acknowledge how insulting this type of logic can be to educators in the 
classroom.  Judging something as intimate and personal as childhood education in the aggregate 
is not only dangerous; it is probably needless.  For teachers who are already working in under-
resourced, over-crowded schools, a mandate that all children should be on grade level (a goal 
which virtually every teacher must already possess) is disrespectful and isolating.  Politicians 
have simply mandated the idealism of every teacher, not acknowledging that as teachers who 
have dedicated their lives to teaching children in their own community, they are already working 
daily to figure out how to make it a reality.  At best, this “what’s the harm” attitude is 
unnecessary.  At worst it breeds hopelessness, a feeling that no one really understands what it 
means to teach.  For a similarly spirited article, see Mimi B. Chenfield, Handcuff Me, Too!, 87 
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 745 (2006) (describing the discontented atmosphere that accountability in 
schools can bring, as told through the eyes of a kindergarten student). 
 54. See 147 CONG. REC. H1179, 4728–4729 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2001) (statement of Rep. 
Keller); 147 CONG. REC. H2311 (daily ed. May 17, 2001) (statement of Rep. Boehner); 147 
CONG. REC. S1725–S1727 (daily ed. Mar. 01, 2001) (statement of Sen. Ensign) (implying that an 
end to “social promotion” would allow a struggling student to finally catch up to his peers). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
908 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:899 
Keller (R–FL), an original co-sponsor of President Bush’s NCLB Act, serves 
as a worthwhile example: 
[W]e have already implemented these same principles, measuring performance 
and demanding accountability, in the great State of Florida.  What happened as 
a result?  We went from having 78 F-rated schools based on low test scores to 
only 4 F schools in the course of only a year. 
  Let me give you two examples.  First, in my district of Orlando, Florida, 
there is a school called Orlo Vista Elementary School.  At this school, 92 
percent of the children are from low-income families and they are entitled to 
receive the free hot lunch program.  Eighty-six percent of the students are 
minorities.  This school was rated as an F school by the State of Florida based 
on abysmally low test scores. 
  However, after measuring the students’ performance, pumping Federal title 
I dollars into the school, along with local school board money and State 
dollars, we were able to make sure that we cured the problem and that all 
children were able to read, write and perform math appropriately.  As a result, 
the school went from having 30 percent of the children pass a standardized test 
in 1 year to over 79 percent of the students being able to pass that same test a 
year later.  It is no longer an F school.55 
This statement seems to illustrate a belief by proponents of NCLB, such as 
Rep. Keller, that an accountability system could mimic this type of result for 
every American public school.  Yet in retrospect, it seems doubtful that 
Congress would believe that by simply measuring performance and increasing 
funding, half of the students in America’s failing schools would magically 
jump from failing to proficient in just one year.  Notwithstanding such a leap 
of logic, illustrations such as Rep. Keller’s demonstrate that the congressional 
intent behind NCLB’s one hundred percent proficiency goal was not entirely 
about “aiming high.”  There was a faint belief, or at least a claim, that it could 
really happen. 
 
 55. 147 CONG. REC. H1179, 4728 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2001) (statement of Rep. Keller).  Rep. 
Keller goes on to tell what could be considered an absurdly miraculous story about taking then 
Secretary of Education Rod Paige to visit this same elementary school to observe the progress.  “I 
took him into a reading lab, and while there he observed a little 6 year-old African-American boy 
reading.  This is a child who, 1 month earlier, was having problems with reading and was set 
apart. . . .  As he leaned over the shoulder . . . he was blown away and so impressed.  This child 
was flying through that book, reading as well as most adults that I know.”  Id.  Although this may 
be an interesting comment on Rep. Keller’s adult acquaintances, it also demonstrates the type of 
persuasive tactics that at least some of NCLB’s proponents used on the Congressional floor.  
Namely, failing schools will turn around in one year, and illiterate children will learn to read in 
one month. 
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B. An Unsupported Proposition: The Implausibility of the Goal 
Whether innocent or not, there is no evidence that such a goal is even 
possible.56  As one critic writes, “[N]otwithstanding more than ten years of 
state school reform efforts founded on the same basic ‘standards, assessments 
and accountability’ principles as NCLB, not a single state has achieved 100% 
‘proficiency’ on NAEP, or anything close.  Indeed, no state has even brought 
50% of its students to that level.”57  In fact, one hundred percent proficiency is 
most likely impossible.58  In 2003, results from the Programme for 
International Student Assessment59 revealed that no country—not “even the 
highest performing countries of Finland, Korea, and Canada—had all of its 
students pass the lowest standard in either math or reading.”60 
The “innocence” of the goal may in reality be arrogance.  In fact, Congress 
actually may have contradicted itself in writing the NCLB Act.  Pointing to 
NCLB’s provision requiring that newly adopted educational programs and 
practices be supported by “scientifically based research” that “has been 
accepted by a peer-reviewed journal or approved by a panel of independent 
 
 56. See Welner, supra note 52, at 172 (“NCLB’s demand that all students become proficient 
was immediately identified as an extreme departure from actual experience . . . .”).  Of course, 
there is also an argument to be made that having one hundred percent of students on grade level is 
statistically impossible, since the term “grade-level” is generally figured by percentile ratings.  
Following such an analysis, there will always be students in high and low percentiles, unless all 
children score exactly the same.  Therefore, unless a national bottom-line was employed (which 
NCLB clearly does not establish), there will always be students in the lowest quartile.  However, 
making such an argument assumes a terrifying amount of ignorance on the part of the drafters of 
NCLB.  Accordingly, this comment proceeds assuming that states are actually able to determine 
grade level according to a fixed standard, independent of bell curve or percentile analysis.  For 
comments on the subject, see generally Gerald W. Bracey, The Perfect Law, DISSENT, Fall 2004, 
at 62–63, available at http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=318.  Professor Bracey discusses 
the problems with defining “proficient,” both under the NAEP and by individual states.  Id.  
Bracey also implies that the law’s inevitable failure was planned to further Bush’s agenda of 
promoting private school vouchers.  Id. 
 57. Gary Ratner, Why the No Child Left Behind Act Needs to Be Restructured to Accomplish 
Its Goals, 9 UDC L. REV. 1, 32 (2007). 
 58. Eric Haas, et al., One Hundred Percent Proficiency: A Mission Impossible, 38 EQUITY & 
EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. 180, 181 (2005); see also Mark Goldberg, Test Mess 2: Are We Doing 
Better a Year Later, 86 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 389 (2005) (stating that no “city, state or country—
other than mythical Lake Wobegon—has ever produced an entire population of students who are 
above average”); but see Cynthia Beaudette, Muscatine School Wins National Honor, QUAD-
CITY TIMES, Sept. 24, 2005, available at http://www.qctimes.com/articles/2005/09/25/news/local/ 
doc43361383d1cc6203044475.txt (reporting on an Iowa elementary school that achieved a 100% 
proficiency rating on the 2003–2004 math test). 
 59. For information on the Programme for International Student Assessment, an 
internationally standardized assessment administered to fifteen year-olds, see Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Programme for International Student Assessment, 
available at http://www.pisa.oecd.org (last visited May 17, 2009). 
 60. Haas et al., supra note 58, at 181. 
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experts through a comparably rigorous, objective and scientific review,”61 
Professor Kevin Welner argues that the law imposes a double-standard:62 
[I]f we held Congress to the same standard as Congress has chosen for school 
districts, then it could not have adopted NCLB.  In fact, peer-reviewed 
scholarship, supported by multiple studies, flatly contradicts the NCLB 100% 
presuppositions.  Although the statute does not, in fact, require the law itself to 
be supported by such scientifically based research, the inconsistency does 
show a staggering level of political arrogance.63 
Moreover, to establish a system of sanctions based on improvement toward 
one-hundred percent student proficiency, one must assume that the sanctioned 
schools are responsible for, and have the ability to improve, student 
achievement.64  As an illustration, consider the middle school that serves 
students in grades six through eight. 65  If a student fails to score at a proficient 
level on the 6th grade mathematics exam, the school would be held 
accountable for such a failure, even though most of the 6th grade student’s 
education occurred at a different elementary school.66  And apart from pointing 
a finger at which school is to blame, several critics point out that it is doubtful 
“schools alone can eliminate achievement gaps in the face of powerful social 
inequalities in the wider society.”67 
The plausibility of one hundred percent proficiency simply is not 
supported by data or experience.  Even the most idealistic educational 
organizations do not declare as one of their goals that all children will be 
proficient in all skills.  Teach For America,68 for example, seeks to end 
educational inequality by sending recent college graduates to some of the 
nation’s lowest performing schools to teach for two years.  That organization 
operates under the motto that “One day all children in this nation will have the 
opportunity to obtain an excellent education.”69  Whether innocently or 
ignorantly, by making a goal based on absolute results Congress has leaped 
over this opportunity factor, shooting for an absurdly ambitious goal in 
choosing the current one hundred percent proficiency goal, the failure of which 
is easily, and perhaps conveniently, calculable. 
 
 61. Welner, supra note 52, at 174 (quoting NCLB, 20 U.S.C. § 7801(37)(B)(vi)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 173. 
 65. See id. at 173–74 (using George W. Bush’s childhood education as a hypothetical to 
illustrate the same point). 
 66. Welner, supra note 52, at 173–74. 
 67. Gamoran, supra note 34, at 6.  The issue of social inequities and their influence on 
education is a complex and hotly debated topic, one not dealt with in this Comment. 
 68. For information on Teach For America, the national teaching corps for recent college 
graduates, see Teach For America, http://www.teachforamerica.org. 
 69. WENDY KOPP, ONE DAY, ALL CHILDREN . . . 185 (2001). 
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III.  ANALYZING NCLB PROBLEMS IN RELATION TO THE 2014 GOAL 
A. “Perverse Incentives” and NCLB 
By its very nature, NCLB’s structure inevitably seeks to label virtually all 
schools as failing.  By 2014 (supposing that the Act as it is now written 
actually survives that long)70 presumably any school with less than 100% 
efficiency will be labeled as failing.71  Following such a course, most of the 
nation’s public schools will eventually face some form of the sanctions 
described above, or at least a “failing” label.72  Scholars, as well as state 
policies themselves, have shown that such a dire fate for states has led to the 
adoption of practices that work contrary to the noble intentions of the Act.73 
Professor James E. Ryan’s 2004 article The Perverse Incentives of No 
Child Left Behind Act74 predicted that the NCLB Act, then in its initial years, 
would create “perverse incentives” that “work against the Act’s goals.”75  
Specifically, Professor Ryan stated that NCLB “creates incentives for states to 
lower academic standards” and “will make it even more difficult for 
disadvantaged students to catch up to their more affluent peers.”76  Although 
Professor Ryan does not stand alone as a critic of NCLB, reviewing his 
predictions nearly four years later, as well as additional evidence that states 
have abandoned some of their proven academic best practices as a result of 
 
 70. See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 932, 985–86 (2004) (“The odds are quite good that the NCLBA is another fad.  By 2014, 
Congress, the President, state officials, and the world will have changed. Schools and students 
may still be subject to standards and testing, but it is unlikely that public schools will be operating 
under the existing framework of the NCLBA.”). 
 71. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F) (2006) (“[N]ot later than 12 years after the end of the 2001–
2002 school year, all students in each group . . . will meet or exceed the State’s proficient level of 
academic achievement on the State assessments . . . .”);  but see Evan Stephenson, Evading the 
No Child Left Behind Act: State Strategies and Federal Complicity, 2006 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 
157, 159 (2006) (arguing that “[s]tates can escape the 100 percent proficiency goal by calculating 
their proficiency statistics using confidence intervals [margins of error]”).  As Stephenson points 
out: “Hypothetically, if a state’s proficiency goal is 100 percent and its margin of error is eight 
percent, the state’s schools may be considered compliant if they reach only ninety-two percent 
proficiency.”  Stephenson, supra note 71, at 159. 
 72. See Stephenson, supra note 71, at 177 (“One study predicts that by 2014, ninety-nine 
percent of California public schools will have failed to make AYP. . . . [Another study] estimates 
that more than 90% of Connecticut elementary and middle schools won’t meet federal education 
standards in 10 years.”). 
 73. See Ryan, supra note 70, at 932–34. 
 74. Id.; see also John H. White, Editorial, Wise Modifications Put No Child Left Behind Law 
on the Right Track, CHI. SUN TIMES, July 3, 2008, available at http://www.isbe.net/news/2008/ 
newsclips/080704.htm#wi (“No one seriously questions the goals of the federal No Child Left 
Behind law.”). 
 75. Ryan, supra note 70, at 934. 
 76. Id. 
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NCLB, demonstrates that his predictions were well-founded. However, 
Professor Ryan does not go so far as to criticize the end goal of NCLB.77 
He should.  It is the struggle to make progress toward that goal, whether 
innocently or perversely, that will continue to cause negative consequences for 
American public education.  The root of these problems is the goal itself.  The 
following three sub-sections describe how. 
B. In Order to Progress Toward the Goal, States Must Lower Their 
Standards 
Since the inception of NCLB, scholars have predicted that many states 
would lower standards to avoid labeling their schools as failing.78  As more 
and more schools continue to fail to make AYP, it has become evident that this 
practice has become reality.79  After all, NCLB clearly allows the states to 
define what they feel are “challenging academic content standards.”80  
Nonetheless, as the 2014 goal approaches, the percentage of students that must 
pass state proficiency tests increases with each year, as does the incentive for 
states to make it easier for them to do so.  The resulting phenomeon has been 
called NCLB’s educational “race to the bottom.”81  Essentially, states have 
nothing to gain by imposing high standards—the law motivates states to find 
the lowest acceptable standard for AYP determinations.82  A recent report by 
the Department of Education, which measured student performance on state 
assessments against the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 
revealed that academic standards vary drastically between states.83 
For example, an eighth grader in Missouri would need the equivalent of a 311 
on the national math test to be judged proficient.  That is actually more 
rigorous than the national test.  In Tennessee, however, a student can meet the 
 
 77. Id. at 944. 
 78. See id. at 947–48. 
 79. See id. at 948; see also SUNDERMAN, KIM & ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 7 (describing a 
“sharply worded letter to the chief state school officers” sent by the Bush Administration after 
states began to redefine what it means to be proficient in reading and mathematics, which accused 
states of trying to “game the system for short-term benefits” and “hide the low performance of 
their schools” (internal citations omitted)). 
 80. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 81. Paul E. Peterson & Frederick M. Hess, Keeping an Eye on State Standards: A Race to 
the Bottom, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2006, at 28, 28. 
 82. Id. 
 83. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS (INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION SCIENCES, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION), MAPPING 2005 STATE PROFICIENCY STANDARDS ONTO THE 
NAEP SCALES 16 (June 2007), available at: http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/studies/200 
7482.pdf. 
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state’s proficiency standard with a 230, a score well below even the basic level 
on the national exam.84 
Time has shown that state standards have changed, but the method that 
states employ to lower standards varies.  First off, there are accusations that 
states, for political or other reasons, simply make the tests easier.85  In some 
cases, critics charge that states are simply writing simpler tests, with more 
accessible language and relatable passages,86 or creating easier formats and 
carefully selecting those tested skills that will yield higher results.87  A 2004 
study by The American Diploma Project, which sought to analyze how high 
the expectations were on six states’ required graduation exams, found that 
none of the tests were overly demanding.88  The study found that the math 
questions on these exams were similar to material that students in other 
countries cover in 7th or 8th grade, and reading comprehension skills that 
“ACT considers more appropriate for the test it gives to 8th and 9th 
graders[.]”89 
Additionally, apart from simply lowering standards, states have 
implemented (and the federal government has approved) plans that simply 
“backload” the largest AYP gains to later years of NCLB’s twelve-year 
timeline.90  While this does not literally lower the education standards, it does 
lower progress goals.91  These schedules, which are similar to a balloon 
payment at the end of a mortgage payment schedule, ask small gains of schools 
 
 84. Tamar Lewin, States Found to Vary Widely on Education, N.Y. TIMES , June 8, 2007, at 
A21 (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 83). 
 85. Michael Winerip, One Secret to Better Test Scores: Make State Reading Tests Easier, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/05/education/05education.html 
(comparing the reading passages of the 2004 New York State Fourth Grade English Language 
Assessment with the “easier passages” of the 2005 assessment). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Kevin Drum, Soaring Test Scores, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June 6, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_06/011441.php (citing Center on 
Education Policy, Answering the Question that Matters Most: Has Student Achievement 
Increased Since No Child Left Behind, June 2007, http://www.cep-dc.org/index.cfm?fuse 
action=document.showDocumentByID&nodeID=1&DocumentID=200.)  In attempting to explain 
why states had experienced significant gains on their own state tests, but not on a standardized 
national test, the Center on Education Policy study states that “for Texas 4th graders, the 
difference in scores between NAEP and state exam was largely explained by differences in the set 
of math skills (multiplication, division, fractions, decimals, etc.) covered by the two tests, and the 
format in which test items were presented (word problems, calculations without words, inclusion 
of a picture, etc.).”  Id. 
 88. THE AMERICAN DIPLOMA PROJECT, DO GRADUATION TESTS MEASURE UP? A CLOSER 
LOOK AT STATE HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMS 27 (2004), available at http://www.njhighschool 
summit.org/ResourceRoom/secure/download.asp?dir=General&file=Graduation%20 Tests.pdf. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Stephenson, supra note 71, at 158. 
 91. Welner, supra note 52, at 172. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
914 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:899 
in the beginning years of NCLB, but demand large gains in the last years just 
before 2014, allowing schools to continue to make AYP, at least in the short 
term.92  As the South Dakota Department of Legislative Audit stated in a 2004 
report, explaining why the state chose to “back load” their annual measurable 
objectives (AMO), 
Since the NCLB Act itself is set to expire in 2008, SD has effectively delayed 
the impact of NCLB’s 100% proficiency goal until after the Act would have to 
be reauthorized. . . . SD is not the only state to have done this and we are not 
saying there is anything wrong with what SD has done. Rather we just point 
out that there are many things to occur legislatively and politically before SD 
will have to make the largest, and arguably the hardest to achieve, gains in 
student proficiency.93 
Although a temporary fix, this practice is attractive because it allows states to 
avoid giving schools failing labels and imposing sanctions. 
But surely this attractiveness wears off when one considers the arbitrary 
sanctions that will arise when, in 2012 (or whenever the large gains are set by 
states), schools that had found ways to make persistent and predictable 
progress suddenly find themselves facing truly insurmountable AYP 
requirements.  As an illustration, consider the following hypothetical.  Imagine 
a school in a “backloading” state that innovatively uses its funds to develop 
alternative curriculum, including specially targeting students with learning 
disabilities and English language learners, and using discretionary funds to 
attract qualified and energetic staff.  Assume that these changes lead to a three 
percent gain in student proficiency for all students and each sub-group during 
the early years of the Act, satisfying AYP requirements.  Despite this progress, 
when faced with the very large gains in the later years, if the school fails 
(which it most likely will),94 the money used to make progress will be shifted 
to conform with NCLB’s sanctions requirements, or eventually into 
restructuring the school altogether.  Thus, a plan intended to forestall sanctions 
can instead make them even more arbitrary and disheartening than they would 
have been if they were applied earlier in the timeline. 
The lesson learned is that one cannot forestall the impossible.  Asking 
states to reach a goal that has no plausible evidence of being reached is 
dangerous.  Attach such a mandate to as sensitive a subject as educating 
children, and states see little choice but to lower the bar or modify definitions 
 
 92. Stephenson, supra note 71, at 158; see also Welner, supra note 52, at 172. 
 93. STATE OF S.D. DEP’T OF LEGIS. AUDIT, A REPORT ON THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 
(NCLB) TO THE 2004 INTERIM DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AGENCY REVIEW COMMITTEE 12 
(Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.state.sd.us/legislativeaudit/NCLB/1Cover.pdf. 
 94. See Welner, supra note 52, at 172 (referring to the “daunting proficiency increases” for 
2009–2010 in Ohio’s plan, and referring to back-loading schemes as “waiting out the train wreck” 
plans). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] SHOOTING FOR THE MOON 915 
of progress in order to make AYP and escape a public perception of failure.  
But these practices are not simply sneaky subterfuge, intended to deceive or 
cheat the system.  They are the natural consequence of the goal.  Accordingly, 
when assessing schools’ progress toward NCLB’s goal, one should consider 
the changing standards that a given state is using, as well as the motivations 
behind defining “proficient.” 
C. NCLB’s Timeline and Its Mandates Cause States to Abandon Their Best 
Educational Practices 
Even if a state chooses not to lower standards, the effect of NCLB’s 
accountability requirements on the quality of their education system can be just 
as detrimental.  The ticking clock toward 2014’s goal does not stop, and 
increasing pressures to make AYP at the school level can change the focus of 
the daily curriculum, causing teachers to “teach to the test,” or neglect 
enrichment subjects or specialized language instructions in order to prepare 
students for the ever-increasing requirements for AYP. 95  In a study conducted 
by The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, about 75% of teachers 
surveyed from sanctioned schools agreed that the AYP requirements of NCLB 
caused teachers to “de-emphasize or neglect untested topics.”96  As one teacher 
from that study observed, “NCLB has become so much the instructional focus 
that . . . needed enrichment experiences are not planned or eliminated because 
they are not tested.”97 
There are also claims that schools that fail to make AYP are forced to cut 
non-tested Arts and Humanities classes.98  In these schools, which are most 
often comprised of low-income students, budgets for art, music, and athletics 
programs are sacrificed in order to focus more resources on the subjects that 
NCLB tests.99 
Apart from best teaching practices, even the ways to measure the one 
hundred percent proficiency goal are disputed.  States must often abandon their 
preferred assessment methods in order to comply with NCLB’s numerous 
testing and reporting requirements.  In Connecticut v. Spellings, a state 
essentially made a claim that in order to comply with NCLB’s annual testing 
 
 95. See Lisa Kelly, Yearning for Lake Wobegon: The Quest for the Best Test at the Expense 
of the Best Education, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 41, 67–71 (1998) (discussing how over-emphasis 
on testing and accountability may cause schools and teachers to sacrifice developmentally 
appropriate curriculum to teach to the test). 
 96. SUNDERMAN, KIM & ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 91. 
 97. Id. at 91–92. 
 98. See generally Ryan S. Vincent, Comment, No Child Left Behind, Only the Arts and 
Humanities: Emerging Inequalities in Education Fifty Years After Brown, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 
127, 142–49 (2004).  The student author recounts how some schools, in order to make AYP, have 
elected to cut programs such as music, art, and athletics.  Id. at 142, 144, 146–48. 
 99. Id. at 144–48. 
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requirements, it would have to either spend more than the Act provided, or 
abandon its own testing and accountability program, which the state claimed 
had proven to be very effective.100  According to Connecticut, its efforts to 
achieve accountability and assessment, which existed well before NCLB, had 
been highly successful, made its students rank among the highest achieving in 
the nation, and substantially narrowed the achievement gap for minority and 
economically disadvantaged students.101  Notably, Connecticut had “designed 
its testing regime and school curriculum around assessments that involve a 
substantial written component.”102  However, because of the cost associated 
with administering and grading such tests, the state only administered the tests 
to grades 4, 6, 8, and 10.103  It gave only formative tests to grades 3, 5, and 7, 
which did not satisfy the requirements of the Act.104  Although the state’s 
primary objection to adhering to NCLB’s testing requirements was fiscal, it 
also expressed concerns about the efficacy of implementing annual 
“summative” (multiple choice) tests.105 
The state thus challenged the Secretary of Education’s denial of a waiver 
from the requirement that non-formative testing occur in every grade and 
asserted that such an interpretation violated the “unfunded mandate” provision 
of the Act.106  The Secretary’s response, as summarized by the court, was that 
“the State wants to employ testing methods that exceed what is required by the 
Act and then blame the federal Government for failing to pay for more than the 
Act itself requires.”107  The court never reached the merits of the claim,108 
however, and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the administrative 
 
 100. 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 475–77 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 101. Id. at 475. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 476 
 104. Id. 
 105. Connecticut, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 476 & n.6 (“Formative testing is solidly grounded in 
scientifically based research, whereas there is no conclusive research that the summative testing 
required by the Secretary has any positive effect on student academic achievement.”). 
 106. Id. at 474.  “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize an officer or 
employee of the federal Government to mandate, direct, or control a State, local educational 
agency, or school’s curriculum, program of instruction, or allocation of State or local resources, 
or mandate a State or any subdivision thereof to spend any funds or incur any costs not paid for 
under this  chapter.”  Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7907a (2000) (emphasis added)). 
 107. Id. at 481. 
 108. Id. at 503. Although the complaint was dismissed in part, Connecticut’s concerns about 
annual testing have been recognized by congressional reformers.  See The Improving Student 
Testing Act, S. 2053, 110th Cong. § 5(f) (2007), introduced by Sen. Feingold (D-WI), which 
would allow states to administer tests just once in elementary school, once in middle school, and 
once in high school. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] SHOOTING FOR THE MOON 917 
decision, which it claimed it did not have under the General Education 
Provision Act (GEPA).109 
Additionally, teachers of students with limited English proficiency (LEP) 
claim that NCLB’s stringent testing requirements force them to abandon their 
own formative assessments, and instead watch their students struggle on 
largely irrelevant assessments.  The American Federation of Teachers states 
that 
[W]ithout native language or linguistically modified assessments, states now 
find themselves in a Catch-22 situation: If a student can’t read an assessment 
because of a language barrier, then the assessment is not a valid measure of the 
student’s academic proficiency.  But students must still take these state 
assessments, even though they serve no valid educational purpose, because 
NCLB requires a 95 percent testing participation rate for each and every 
student subgroup.110 
The result is that student sub-groups (LEP students as well as special education 
students) who by definition must be below grade level in order to be a member 
of that sub-group, can cause a school that would otherwise make AYP to 
fail.111  This phenomenon has been of special concern to schools and 
legislators.112 
D. The Goal Causes Historically Failing Schools to Continue to Lag Behind 
“Aiming high” is assumedly intended to lead failing schools toward 
success.  Yet another problem evidenced is that the changes and sanctions 
 
 109. Connecticut, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 482, 503; see General Provisions Concerning Education 
– Judicial Review, 20 U.S.C. § 1234g (2006).  The statute provides that after the Secretary makes 
a “final agency action,” it may only be appealed to the appropriate United States Court of 
Appeals.  20 U.S.C. § 1234g(a)–(b).  Subsequent lawsuits by Connecticut have been equally 
unsuccessful, even where the district court found jurisdiction over the controversy.  See 
Connecticut v. Spellings, 549 F. Supp. 2d 161, 174 (D. Conn. 2008) (“The Secretary did not act 
arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in concluding that the State’s proposed plan 
amendments were contrary to the dictates of the Act.”). 
 110. American Federation of Teachers, AFT on English Language Learners and ‘Adequate 
Yearly Progress’ Calculations (2004); see also KATE MENKEN, ENGLISH LEARNERS LEFT 
BEHIND 97, 118 (2008) (“ELLs [English Language Learners] are particularly vulnerable to high-
stakes decisions based on test results . . . . Due to the importance of these exams for ELLs and 
those who educate them, educators . . . are under strong pressure to ‘teach to the test,’ and closely 
align the education of English language learners to the exams by focusing instruction on test 
content and skills or, more explicitly, by devoting class time to teaching test items and test-taking 
strategies.”). 
 111. See GARY L. SUNDERMAN, HOLDING NCLB ACCOUNTABLE 165 (2007). 
 112. See The School Accountability Improvements Act, S. 1236, 110th Cong. § 5(2) (2007).  
This bill, introduced by Sen. Murkowski (R-AK), would allow a school that missed AYP solely 
because of performance by the LEP or students with disabilities sub-group to avoid NCLB 
sanctions by implementing improvement plans that target just those sub-groups.  See id. 
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invoked by NCLB actually cause schools that are historically on the low end of 
the achievement gap to continue to fail.  First of all, because of the sub-group 
reporting criteria of NCLB,113 the most diverse schools (those with large 
numbers of black, Hispanic, economically-disadvantaged, or other historically 
low-performing students) are “more likely to be labeled as not making [AYP] 
simply because their larger number of population subgroups means that they 
have more targets to hit.”114 
Secondly, the march toward one hundred percent proficiency means that 
each year, schools have a more difficult AYP standard to meet.  For failing 
schools, or those schools close to failing, NLCB creates an obvious response—
we must raise test scores, and we must do it now.  Short-term responses 
include offering (and paying for) school choice and supplemental education 
services.115  When those measures fail to meet the ever increasing AYP goal, 
NCLB requires even more drastic changes such as new curriculums, new staff, 
or complete school restructuring.116 
However, many critics claim that this practice actually works against 
creating a sustainable infrastructure of quality education within a school.117  
For example, in a fascinating thesis, a group of professors from the University 
of Connecticut applied microeconomic theory to show that not only is the one 
hundred percent proficiency goal impossible; it “will impede, if not actually 
prevent, the attainment of a high-quality education for all students.”118  
Basically, the group contends, the immediate measures that schools will take to 
make AYP may work in the short term, but these measures will lead to costs of 
“unsustainable levels,” causing school programs to “degrade for lack of 
resources.”119  As Professor Andy Hargreaves and Dean Fink argue, 
The emphasis on change has obliterated the importance of continuity.   
  In urban schools, teachers see their principals come and go as though they 
were passing through revolving doors.  They learn quickly how to resist or 
ignore the leader’s efforts.  The result is that school improvement becomes like 
a set of bobbing corks, with schools rising under one set of leaders, only to 
sink under the next.120 
 
 113. See supra Part I.B. 
 114. Gamoran, supra note 34, at 4–5. 
 115. See supra Part I.A. 
 116. See supra notes 25–33 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Andy Hargreaves & Dean Fink, Sustaining Leadership, 84 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 693 
(2003). 
 118. Haas et al., supra note 58, at 180. 
 119. Id. at 183. 
 120. Hargreaves & Fink, supra note 117, at 699.  The authors also note that “by 2005, 70% of 
the senior managers in public service in the U.S. will be eligible for retirement.  This mass exodus 
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Failing labels can also lead to a lack of teacher permanence.  For example, 
the pressures of probation on teachers led to high attrition rates and a “lack of 
commitment in conjunction with already difficult working conditions” in some 
of the perpetually failing schools in Maryland and Kentucky, as chronicled by 
the work of educational professor Heinrich Mintrop.121  In one Maryland 
elementary school, which had been labeled as failing for over three years, 78% 
of teachers had between one and five years of experience, with the average 
among them being just 1.6 years.122  Because of this phenomenon, this school, 
like many other failing schools, had to continually train new teachers on the 
state standards and assessments and “was prevented from developing a stable 
cadre of well-trained professionals capable of providing the type of instruction 
needed for its students to meet the state’s rigorous achievement standards.”123  
As Professor Hargreaves and Dean Fink note, “[I]mprovements in test results 
in the short run are being bought at the expense of the ability to recruit and 
retain teachers over the long term, since teaching driven by short-term results 
is not the kind of teaching that teachers want to do.”124 
A study conducted by UCLA Professor Meredith Phillips and Jennifer 
Flashman, which analyzed teacher attitudes toward accountability policies, at 
least in part confirmed this suspicion.125  The results suggested that “increased 
testing may cause teachers in the most disadvantaged schools to feel as though 
they have less autonomy over their teaching methods than do their peers in 
other schools, providing yet another reason for good teachers to prefer to teach 
in better-off schools.”126 
In addition to the school’s staff and infrastructure, student mobility, 
encouraged through the school choice sanction, may create a barrier (or 
loophole) for schools to escape accurate assessment of student proficiency.127  
Students who do not attend school for a full academic year because they 
change schools are not necessarily counted in the testing school’s AYP 
 
will cause ‘unique challenges for numerous agencies in maintaining leadership continuity, 
institutional memory, and workforce experience.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 121. HEINRICH MINTROP, SCHOOLS ON PROBATION: HOW ACCOUNTABILITY WORKS (AND 
DOESN’T WORK) 62 (2004). 
 122. Id. at 90. 
 123. Id. at 90–91. 
 124. Hargreaves & Fink, supra note 117, at 694 (citation omitted). 
 125. See generally Meredith Phillips & Jennifer Flashman, How Did the Statewide 
Assessment and Accountability Policies of the 1990s Affect Instructional Quality in Low-Income 
Elementary Schools?, in STANDARDS-BASED REFORM AND THE POVERTY GAP: LESSONS FOR NO 
CHILD LEFT BEHIND 45 (Adam Gamoran ed., 2007). 
 126. Id. at 70–71 (citation omitted). 
 127. Paul Weckstein, Accountability and Student Mobility Under Title I of the No Child Left 
Behind Act, 72 J. NEGRO EDUC. 117, 117 (2003). 
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determination.128  Thus, failing schools could be motivated to encourage their 
lowest performing students to transfer, and schools receiving such transfers 
would have less incentive to provide adequate services for these students if the 
transfer occurred after the start of the academic year.129 
Even assuming schools would not resort to these types of tactics to avoid 
NCLB sanctions, critics of school choice have nonetheless made dire 
predictions about the long term effect that school choice will have on schools 
in low-income neighborhoods.  One critic writes that “[choice] will . . . drain 
these schools of a precious human resource, the highest motivated and 
achieving students with the most involved parents.  The concentration and 
proportion of the most at-risk children will be increased in the poorest schools, 
which will have even fewer resources to work with.”130 
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that testing and imposing sanctions 
is expensive for states.  Although federal funding for education has increased 
since NCLB, federal dollars still make up a small percentage of a state’s 
overall education budget (according to the Education Department, federal 
dollars make up about 17% of the states’ total education budget).131  Additional 
testing requirements, transfers, and supplemental services “draw resources 
away from struggling schools.”132  So the students who don’t transfer are left 
in a resource-drained school.133 
It appears that the issue of disparate funding might actually be getting 
some attention from the legal community.  In what is probably the first victory 
for NCLB plaintiffs, albeit small and perhaps short-lived, the Sixth Circuit 
recently revived a lawsuit by three states which charged that NCLB required 
states to comply with mandates that were not being paid for under the Act.134  
Under the “Spending Clause,”135 “Congress has broad power to set the terms 
 
 128. Id. at 120; see 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xi) (2006) (“[S]tudents who have attended 
more than 1 school in the local educational agency in any academic year shall be used only in 
determining the progress of the local educational agency.”). 
 129. Weckstein, supra note 127, at 120–21. 
 130. Douglas A. Archbald, School Choice, Magnet Schools, and the Liberation Model: An 
Empirical Study, 77 SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 283, 287 (2004) (quoting JUDITH PEARSON, 
MYTHS OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE 105 (1993)). 
 131. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT K–12 EDUCATION FUNDING 2 (2005), 
available at http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/index.html (“In the 2004–05 school 
year, 83 cents out of every dollar spent on education [was] estimated to come from state and local 
levels.”). 
 132. Gamoran, supra note 34, at 5. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 257 (6th Cir. 
2008), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 05-2708, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12121 (6th 
Cir. May 1, 2008). 
 
 135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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on which it disburses federal money to the States.”136  However, when the 
funds are conditional, such conditions “must be set out ‘unambiguously.’”137  
The plaintiffs in Pontiac v. Spellings charged, and the Sixth Circuit agreed in a 
2-1 decision, that the “unfunded mandate provision”138 of the Act could be 
read to mean that a “[s]tate need not comply with requirements that are ‘not 
paid for under the Act.’”139  Therefore, according to the plaintiffs, because 
Congress did not provide states and school districts enough money to comply 
with the Act, they could not be punished for non-compliance.140  Nonetheless, 
the Sixth Circuit has since granted a rehearing en banc, so an ultimate 
resolution of the “unfunded mandate” issue is likely years away. 
For low-performing schools, NCLB’s one hundred percent proficiency 
goal is incredibly, and perhaps deliberately, difficult to meet.  With its absolute 
goal, schools that start out as the lowest performing will be the first to be 
sanctioned, whether they show progress or not.  But these sanctions draw 
resources away by requiring education funds be used to pay for testing and 
sanctions requirements.  They also cause an evaporation of the few quality 
teachers and students left in failing schools.  In this way, the absolute goal of 
one hundred percent proficiency leads to perpetually failing schools. 
IV.  PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE GOAL 
In fairness, it should be noted at the outset that the biggest critique of 
NCLB, at least by congressional opponents, was fiscal.  Part of the problem 
could be, as many have claimed, that the White House has not requested, and 
Congress has not appropriated, nearly the amount of funding originally 
authorized under the Act.141  Thus, one could claim that a surge of money 
could lead to greater progress toward the 2014 goal.  Former Senator Hillary 
Clinton (D-NY), among others, took this stance during her time in the 
Senate.142  However, according to many advocates of NCLB, the funding is not 
 
 136. Id. at 261 (quoting Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 
(2006)). 
 137. Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 261 (quoting Arlington, 548 U.S. at 296). 
 138. 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2006), which reads, “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
authorize an officer or employee of the Federal Government to mandate, direct, or control a State, 
local educational agency, or school’s curriculum, program of instruction, or allocation of State or 
local resources, or mandate a State or any subdivision thereof to spend any funds or incur any 
costs not paid for under this chapter.” 
 139. Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 272. 
 140. Id. at 254. 
 141. Welner & Weitzman, supra note 5, at 242–43. 
 142. See Online Education Database, Comparison: Presidential Candidates on Major 
Education Issues (Aug. 21, 2007), http://oedb.org/library/features/comparison-presidential-
candidates-on-major-education-issues (stating that “President Bush’s budget for 2007 provides 
$12 billion less than was promised by the No Child Left Behind Act . . . .”). 
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the real issue.  Education undersecretary Eugene Hickok has proclaimed that 
“the color of change is not always green.”143  Nonetheless, although the 
funding of NCLB is a continuing issue which should or should not be 
downplayed, it is doubtful that these appropriation concerns will be resolved 
before the Act is reauthorized. 
But turning to the one hundred percent proficiency goal, in the 
congressional debate to reauthorize NCLB, there has been some discussion of 
the 2014 goal.  One strategy is to re-target the deadline date of the one hundred 
percent proficiency timeline.  Rep. Betty McCollum (D-MN) introduced a bill 
that would simply move the deadline back four years to 2018.144  Perhaps more 
creatively, “The No Child Left Behind Flexibility and Improvement Act,” 
introduced by Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME), would allow the Secretary of 
Education, at her discretion, to extend the timeline for states and schools to 
reach one hundred percent proficiency.145  Under Sen. Collins’s proposal, the 
Secretary would review the timeline every three years and could modify it if 
she felt it was “in the interest of improving student achievement.”146 
Other proposals seek to keep the goal in tact, but change the way AYP is 
measured to allow states and schools more flexibility in how they show 
progress toward proficiency.  The current law actually does allow states to use 
other indicators besides standardized assessments.147  However, states can only 
use such indicators “to identify additional schools for school improvement or 
in need of corrective action or restructuring,” not to help schools make AYP or 
show how a school is succeeding.148  Plans such as “The No Child Left Behind 
Reform Act,” introduced by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT), would change this.149  
Sen. Dodd’s plan would strike the section of the Act that restricts a state’s use 
of additional indicators as only being used to identify additional failing 
schools.150  The bill would also allow states to use “measures of individual or 
 
 143. Welner & Weitzman, supra note 5, at 246 (citing Diana J. Schemo, Critics Say Money 
for Schools Falls Short of Promises, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A16). 
 144. Student Achievement and Successful Schools Act of 2007, H.R. 1169, 110th Cong. § 
4(a)(1)(B) (2007).  For the timeline goal, Sen. McCollum’s bill would replace the words “12 
years” (which resulted in 2014), with the words “16 years” (resulting in the year 2018).  Id. 
 145. No Child Left Behind Flexibility and Improvements Act, S. 562, 110th Cong. § 2(2) 
(2007).  The bill would amend the timeline section of NCLB, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F), to state 
that “Every 3 years, the Secretary . . . shall review the requirements of the timeline . . . and may 
issue guidance or regulations modifying such requirements if the Secretary determines, at the 
Secretary’s discretion and after a review of the progress of the States towards making adequate 
yearly progress for the 2013–2014 school year, that modifications to the timeline are in the 
interests of improving student achievement and are in keeping with the purpose of this title.”  Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(vii) (2006). 
 148. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(D)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 149. The No Child Left Behind Reform Act, S. 1194, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 150. Id. § 2(a)(2)(A). 
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cohort growth over time based on the academic assessments implemented” in 
accordance with NCLB.151  Although the language in the bill is a bit 
ambiguous, it would seem schools could make AYP by demonstrating success 
in other ways besides standardized tests including, according to Sen. Dodd, 
“dropout rates, the number of students who participate in advanced placement 
courses, and individual student improvement over time.”152 
However, none of the proposed plans seems poised to solve the problems 
mentioned above.  The first set of solutions, which seek to tweak the timeline 
for the one hundred percent proficiency goal, offer too weak an answer to 
correct the perverse incentives.  Although Professor Ryan and the South 
Dakota legislature,153 among many, predicted that the deadline would move, 
there is no logic which follows that giving a few more years to attain 
perfection will make perfection any more realistic.  Sen. Collins’s proposal, 
which would give the Secretary discretion to extend the timeline, is similarly 
inadequate.  Moreover, since NCLB’s inception, the Secretary has been 
anything but willing to grant such waivers.154 
Senator Dodd’s plan, which would allow alternative methods of 
determining AYP, seems more appealing but suffers from the same fatal flaw 
as the current NCLB goal.  It speaks in absolute results.  One can see how 
statistics such as dropout rates, or the number of students enrolled in state-
defined “advanced placement classes,” or even individual student performance, 
can be manipulated in order to adhere to an implausible and absolute goal of 
one hundred percent.  So long as the goal is an unattainable absolute, the 
perverse incentives will likely exist. 
V.  ANALYSIS: ABANDONING OPPORTUNITY FOR 100% “TREADING WATER” 
In their 2006 article debating the advantages of educational adequacy vs. 
educational equality, Professors William Koski and Rob Reich rationalized, “If 
the state settles for adequacy in the orientation of educational policy, it 
effectively cements the educational advantages of the well off; it confers on 
them the state’s imprimatur in using public schools to entrench advantages that 
they are already securing at home, in private.”155  This point is well taken.  
NCLB leans toward a policy of adequacy by functionally asking states to get as 
many kids as possible to minimum proficiency.  While the grand intention of 
 
 151. Id. § 2(a)(1)(B). 
 152. Statement of Sen. Dodd on the No Child Left Behind Reform Act (Apr. 6, 2005), 
available at http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/3344 (last visited May 17, 2009). 
 153. See supra Part III.A–B. 
 154. See generally Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Conn. 2006) (discussed 
supra Part II.C). 
 155. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat From Equity in 
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 613–14 (2006). 
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NCLB might not be to cement the advantages of the well-off, it might be the 
result of having a goal of one hundred percent proficiency. 
As stated above, NCLB has led to problems of lowered state standards, the 
abandonment of educational best practices, the draining of valuable resources 
from states, and, especially, failing schools.156  Granted, NCLB funding has 
not been near what was initially promised.  But financing problems aside, even 
outspoken critics have been hampered in their effectiveness because, as 
Professor Ryan stated, “it is difficult to criticize the overarching goal of the 
Act, which is to ensure that all students are academically proficient in the not-
so-distant future.”157 
Yet the results of the NCLB timeline summarized above clearly 
demonstrate that it is indeed time to criticize.  Even if properly funded, the 
mechanisms of NCLB appear to work in direct opposition to Bush’s stated 
mission of combating the “soft bigotry of low expectations.”  To realize this, 
one must recall why the federal government got involved in education in the 
first place.  The message of Brown v. Board of Education, one that has been 
cited by many dear to the cause of improving American education, is that “it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the state 
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms.”158  In his 2008 State of the Union address, George W. Bush 
seemed to make a similar appeal to providing this opportunity, lecturing, 
“[W]e must trust students to learn if given the chance.”159 
Of course the irony in Bush’s statement is thick.  In its goal, NCLB does 
not measure opportunity and does not seek to give poor students a “chance.”  
NCLB mandates a result.  True, NCLB goes to great lengths to measure what 
students can do.  But the measurement, the accountability, and the sanctions 
stop so long as the kid is adequate.  What NCLB has done, regardless of how it 
has been funded, is force states to move away from Brown’s promise of 
opportunity and change their educational focus from “opportunity” to “result.”  
That is why the goal does not work.  This is especially true for the 
disadvantaged members of the targeted sub-groups.  For those students, and all 
others for that matter, states will be said to have provided enough of an 
education if the students pass a test of basic skills.  Once that level is reached, 
the requirement is met.  Why educate any further?  A goal of one hundred 
percent proficiency does not ask how high, only how many. 
 
 156. See supra Part III.B–C. 
 157. Ryan, supra note 70, at 944. 
 158. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added). 
 159. 154 CONG. REC. S391 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2008) (State of the Union Address by President 
Bush). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] SHOOTING FOR THE MOON 925 
Most troubling is the evidence (presented above) of schools lowering their 
standards in order to comply.160  If the schools that have struggled to make 
AYP were to actually take the goal seriously―or even worse, actually achieve 
it―the end result could be an even worse case of soft bigotry.161  For students 
in failing schools, what is left is a school system that functions like a one-day 
swimming lesson, where the instruction stops after the child learns to tread 
water.  In other words, if you can’t teach one hundred percent of students in 
low-performing schools to swim, then just redefine what the word “swim” 
means.  Call this “soft bigotry” or “low expectations” or any other politically 
motivating term, but this is the inescapable result of mandating that everyone 
be at the same destination in 2014.  The only solution is for this “destination,” 
at least as it is defined for low-income and minority students, to be more easily 
attainable.  This is not done by giving kids more opportunity, but by changing 
how states categorize the result.  It will not be the affluent, but the historically 
failing schools, the very same broken and tattered institutions that NCLB 
supposedly targets, which will sacrifice educational opportunity for tested 
result. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether innocently or ignorantly, NCLB functions pursuant to an 
implausible goal of one hundred percent proficiency for all students, in all core 
subjects, by 2014.  This goal is almost indisputably unattainable.  Yet it is 
accepted as an innocent ambition, or at least too noble a proposition to 
question.  However, linking absolute results to this unattainable ambition has 
caused states to lower standards and abandon their own educational best 
practices, and there is evidence that it causes low-performing schools to 
perpetually fail.  Put it together, and the Act ensures that states are motivated 
to teach less and call it proficient.  The reality is this: NCLB claims to 
encourage rigorous standards, yet accepts increasingly easier ones.  NCLB 
claims to strive toward providing opportunity, but tries to measure it with one-
day test results that have been watered down or tailored to limited criteria.  
 
 160. See supra Part III.B. 
 161. For a critique of how Bush’s statement regarding the “soft bigotry of low-expectations” 
has been used by proponents of NCLB to dismiss opponents’ claims that NCLB does not address 
the external problems in low-income communities where schools are located, see James Forman, 
Jr., From Martin Luther King to Bill Cosby: Race and Class in the Twenty-First Century, 50 
VILL. L. REV. 213, 219–22 (2005).  Professor Forman states, sarcastically, “The problem is not, 
for example, that urban schools need substantially greater funding than they currently get.  It is 
not that, though children from poor neighborhoods often have wonderful gifts, many also need 
extra academic and other supports far beyond the small supplements that Title I currently 
provides.  To make this argument, we are told, is to indulge in the ‘soft bigotry of low 
expectations.’”  Id. (citations omitted). 
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NCLB sacrifices quality and opportunity for the sake of avoiding sanctions and 
striving toward a goal, the foundations of which are political rhetoric. 
In order to succeed, the one hundred percent proficiency goal must be 
either abolished or dramatically altered.  Schools’ success must be determined 
by the quality of opportunity they offer students in order to continue the spirit 
of Brown.  Test results may be one indicator of this, but they cannot be 
absolute.  Concededly, measuring the type of opportunity a school provides is 
somewhat abstract and does not shine the same spotlight on failing schools as 
do test results.  Even assuming test results are the best indicator of student 
performance, it should not be forgotten who is making and who is grading 
these tests.  And who is defining what “result” is proficient.  No matter where 
the bar is set, the education system and the nation are both left behind if it 
becomes acceptable for schools to teach all of their children to tread water, but 
in doing so, to sacrifice teaching them how to swim. 
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